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The creative economy: invention of a global orthodoxy
Philip Schlesinger*
Centre for Cultural Policy Research, University of Glasgow, 13 Professor Square, Glasgow G12
8QQ, UK
(Received 6 June 2016; ﬁnal version received 11 June 2016)
This essay considers how policy thinking about culture has been steadily transformed
into an overwhelmingly economic subject matter whose central trope is the “creative
economy”. The development of current ideas and their background are discussed.
Policy ideas ﬁrst fully developed in the UK have had a global resonance: the
illustrative examples of the European Union and the United Nations are discussed.
The embedding of creative economy thinking in British cultural institutions such as
the BBC and cultural support bodies is illustrated. The impact of current orthodoxy
on academic institutions and research is also considered. Countervailing trends are
weak. New thinking is now required.
Keywords: BBC; creative economy; cultural policy; discourse; European Union;
intermediaries; United Nations
Introduction
In reﬂections on different forms of academic writing, the philosopher Vilém Flusser (2002,
194) remarked that the “essay is not merely the articulation of a thought, but of a thought as
a point of departure for a committed existence”. The virtues of this particular style of
expression greatly appeal to me for present purposes, which involve the somewhat
dogged pursuit of an argument because it matters greatly. Flusser counter-posed this
style of argument to what he called the “academicism” of the treatise, which claimed
the qualities of rigour and detachment. Were he one of our contemporaries writing about
the creative economy, he would probably inveigh against the fetishism of “evidence-led
policy”, which has been key to the discourse I shall describe here.
This piece is less essayistic than I would wish. It pays obeisance to the need to docu-
ment the case in ways that beﬁt this 30th anniversary contribution to Innovation and natu-
rally, it must be referenced, as the detail will be unfamiliar to many readers. The slightly
polemical tone is a necessary antidote to scholasticism and mealy-mouthed approval. I
have been increasingly struck by how difﬁcult it is not to talk approvingly and largely
uncritically about the “creative industries” and the “creative economy”. These tropes pre-
sently dominate policy debate and media discussion about culture. This discursive domi-
nance has become both a conceptual and practical obstacle to thinking afresh and in the
round about culture and the complexity of cultural work in the digital age. In short, I
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would contend that the idea of the creative economy has increasingly obscured and
crowded out conceptions of culture that are not in some way subordinate to economic con-
siderations. Intelligent policy-makers and smart government advisers know that this is so
and that their evidence rests on uncertain ground – at least, that is what they tell me pri-
vately. What ﬁgures in such conversations does not, on the whole, enter the public
domain because the expedient argument that turns culture into economic value is seen
as the only really comprehensible and sellable formula in our times. That is one of my con-
clusions from empirical research on and engagement in this topic.
The cultural analyst, George Yúdice, has described how a particular version of what he
terms the “expediency of culture” has come to dominate public discourse and key insti-
tutions, both global and national. The state’s interest in culture, he argues, is presently legit-
imized by instrumental and utilitarian arguments. First, he contends, this is due to the scale
of migration in a globalized world: this has rendered problematic “the use of culture as a
national expedient” through which a common value system for a citizenry might be built.
Second, he suggests that in the USA the end of Cold War ideological competition led to the
withdrawal of much public subvention for the arts. A rapid shift ensued to “an expanded
conception of culture that can solve problems, including job creation.… Because almost
all actors in the cultural sphere have latched onto this strategy, culture is no longer experi-
enced, valued, or understood as transcendent”. This means that “artists are being channeled
to manage the social” and have become the focus of a specialized couche of “managerial
professionals” (Yúdice 2003, 11–12).1
That expert grouping includes not only cultural bureaucrats but also academics, as I can
testify. Over the past couple of decades, I have been deeply involved, over considerable
periods of time, as a board member or adviser in the work of several bodies in the UK con-
cerned with culture and media.2 That experience has reinforced my view that in the ﬁeld of
cultural policy the pragmatic adaptation to ruling ideas – conformity often without convic-
tion, if you like – is a functional and highly serviceable equivalent to committed belief.
Because this article is anatomizing a resilient ideology, in all probability it will be cited
by similar-minded critics but ignored where it really counts – namely, by those with the
greatest power to frame strategies and practices in cultural policy. That is an observation
and certainly not a complaint, as we can and do make choices about the spaces we
occupy in an “intellectual ﬁeld” – to use Pierre Bourdieu’s phrase – and these decisions
duly shape the strategies that we then pursue. As with earlier pieces that I have written
on this theme (Schlesinger 2007, 2009, 2013), I know that the central argument will
bounce off the resilient carapace of creative economy adherents’ belief system. The
same may be said for the related work of like-minded critical colleagues internationally
(Bustamante 2011). There is indeed a “counter-discourse” (Vötsch and Weiskopf 2009)
that critiques the assumptions and blind spots of creative economy thinking but although
of analytical importance, this has not inﬂuenced the juggernaut’s seemingly inexorable
progress. To be ignored in these matters, then, perhaps confers a perverse badge of
honour. It is not that interested and contending parties cannot quite politely and even ami-
cably discuss their different perspectives. It is, rather, that when it comes to the public pro-
jection of argument and analysis, there is no great meeting of minds. Rather, there is an
increasing tendency for contending views to become self-sustaining and self-contained.
This is not the place for a detailed deconstruction of the different forms of discourse
that substantiate these contentions. In an imperfectly realized essay such as this, one
may let the contention stand and offer passing illustration rather than seek to provide
exhaustive demonstration. If we take recent academic compilations of work in the ﬁeld
as an indication of the existence of different camps gathered under distinct conceptual
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banners, these offer a useful marker of, for instance, the divergence between advocates of
the “creative economy” and proponents of the “cultural economy” (Jones, Lorenzen, and
Sapsed 2015; Oakley and O’Connor 2015). For the latter, rallying round this term may
offer an alternative starting point for those opposed to the economization of culture.
The politics of recent discourse
The origins of the discourse of the creative economy are indeed political, sensu stricto,
because it is positions taken by governments that have most often have been the prime
movers of this kind of perspective. Given its reproductive character, much of the discourse
itself falls into another speciﬁc, subordinate, category, namely the expert domain of policy-
making and practical implementation (Maasen and Weingart 2005).
Both ofﬁcial and expert discourses that ﬁnd their way into reports, parliamentary debate
and academic works in the cultural ﬁeld are commonly recycled rather uncritically by media
reports, taken seriously by not a few academics seeking funding, and most consequentially,
become embedded in the practice of intermediary bodies acting in, and on, the cultural ﬁeld.
This incorporation into thought and practice takes place at various, interconnected, levels of
the global system: in world bodies such as the United Nations (notably, UNESCO); inside
regional entities such as the European Union (EU); and, of course, within states.
To understand how a particular form of political discourse is fashioned and dissemi-
nated, we need to explain its conditions of existence – in particular, the agency of the pro-
ducers, the material and symbolic means at their disposal and the interests that they pursue.
We may think of such discourses as situated within intellectual ﬁelds that are constituted as
spaces of contestation: loci in which strategies are pursued by given groups and individuals
by way of contention in argument, the provision of evidence and the fashioning of sym-
bolic representations, and also in respect of ﬁerce competition for public attention and
the quest to secure positions of inﬂuence in government and public bodies.
What Bourdieu (1993) calls the “cycle of consecration” – the development of repu-
tation, if you like – is quite distinctive when it comes to selling policy. It is different,
for instance, from creating demand for an artwork or artist. Rather, it is a matter of ﬂooding
the market with an ideology so as to crowd out or marginalize alternatives. To establish and
defend such symbolic capital requires continual effort in securing the dominance of a given
set of deﬁnitions. It is the need for such continuous action to secure deﬁnitional advantage
that explains the repetitive (if continually modiﬁed) discursive production in the ﬁeld.
If the struggle to command attention and, with it, the desire to occupy the commanding
heights of credibility, is central to the pursuit of argument in the politics of policy, the dis-
tribution of resources to prepare discursive strategies is of key importance in how well it
equips antagonists to perform in the public domain.
The structural advantage in framing policies often (but not invariably) lies with ofﬁcial
and expert sources, which tend to peddle a rather simple storyline when it comes to pre-
senting accounts prefabricated for media reporting. Typically, the UK Government’s Crea-
tive industries economic estimates 2015 told us that one in 12 UK jobs was in the creative
economy and that the creative industries accounted for 5.6% of total employment and also
5% of the UK economy’s turnover (DCMS 2015, 4). This became headline news – and
more importantly, common sense.
If we restrict ourselves to considering only policy outputs that appear in the public
domain, we end up failing to recognise that sub rosa there has already been considerable
lobbying and manoeuvring within a policy community to favour given options. Seemingly
authoritative pronouncements are commonly the outcome of a hidden process of selection
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and elaboration inside government and related policy elites. Hidden, because it is largely
conducted behind the scenes. But that does not mean it is secret. Such dealings can some-
times be reconstructed by way of research (Schlesinger 2009).
The creative turn
How did the so-called creative turn become so pervasive? And what is the “creative
economy” supposed to be?
The tale could be told in several ways. One illustrative account goes as follows. It was
the marketing of the term the “creative industries” in 1997–1998 by the ﬁrst British New
Labour government, led by Prime Minister Tony Blair, which ﬁrmly put this trope on the
national agenda. Then, as the ideas caught on beyond the UK, they shifted by stages onto
the global plane. Creative industries discourse was developed as a political-economic
project in the Department for Culture, Media, and Sport (DCMS) by the team around
Chris Smith, New Labour Secretary of State for that ministry. Expertise provided by
think tanks, policy advisers and industry ﬁgures contributed signiﬁcantly to shaping the
policy process (Hesmondhalgh et al. 2015).
The socio-linguist Norman Fairclough (2000, 22–23) has shown how “assumptions
about the global economy’ led to an emphasis on competition between Britain and other
countries”, a “project of renewal designed to improve Britain’s competitive position”. In
the UK, this framework has remained in place, irrespective of the government in power.
Thus, contrary to the view that the intellectuals are at best a marginal force in our
society – that they have become mere “interpreters”, rather than “legislators” in the
terms espoused by Bauman (1992) – there is plainly a public policy intelligentsia eager
to shape the world of cultural policy through discourse and action. The production of dis-
course and related policy proposals has now continued for some two decades in the UK and
not only there, because ideas have circulated globally through policy spaces and insti-
tutions, and moreover, become increasingly embedded in academic research and teaching
internationally.
Reﬂecting in retrospect, former UK Culture Secretary Chris Smith (2013) – himself
part of the policy intelligentsia – has remarked:
In 1998 – as secretary of state for culture, media and sport in the newly-elected Labour gov-
ernment – I published a book, Creative Britain. In it, I argued that the arts were for everyone,
not just the privileged few; and that the creative industries – dependent for their success on
individual artistic creativity – had moved from the fringes to the centre of the UK
economy, with huge beneﬁts for the social and economic health of the nation. I called for
the nurturing and celebration of creative talent to be at the heart of the political agenda.
This quotation – reﬂecting afterthoughts some 15 years on – encapsulates the essentials of
the creative economy belief system.
It was not Smith’s book, however, that became the original keystone of the discourse.
Looking back, it is striking just how much an expediently written policy paper came to
exert an exceptional inﬂuence in generating an initial framework for discussion. The
UK DCMS’ deﬁnition of the creative industries in the very ﬁrst Creative Industries
Mapping Document has been cited copiously not only in the Anglosphere but everywhere:
Those activities which have their origin in individual creativity, skill and talent and which have
a potential for wealth and job creation through the generation and exploitation of intellectual
property. (1998, 3)
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The key move was to aggregate 13 distinct ﬁelds of cultural practice, to designate these as
“industries”, and so to constitute a new policy object whose central purpose was – and
remains – to “maximise economic impact… at home and abroad”. Moreover, by
making the exploitation of intellectual property so crucial, the complexity of cultural
value was subordinated to economic value.
Some have denounced this approach as the acme of neo-liberalism – understood in this
instance as the celebration of individualistic entrepreneurship in a free market. As a correc-
tive, in their deﬁnitive new book on New Labour cultural policy, Hesmondhalgh et al.
(2015) have rightly pointed to wider objectives pursued by the British creativistas – the
boost to arts spending, the attempts at social inclusion, the educational aspirations. The
question, perhaps, is how much these other goals have truly acted as counterweights to
the centrality of economics.
Naturally, the “creative turn” had antecedents. One inﬂuential interpretation of the
history of pertinent ideas suggests that the conceptual journey started with the “culture
industry” of mass communication critiqued by Horkheimer and Adorno (1997 [1944]).
Subsequently, this approach was reformulated by ﬁgures such as Garnham (1990
[1984]) in Britain and Miège (2004 [1984]) in France, who developed a Marxist political
economy of the “cultural industries” (to which media were central). The political econo-
mization of culture became the intellectual basis for cultural industries policies pursued
by left-wing policy-makers as one response to urban decline and de-industrialization,
and also in some instances (notably in France) as part of the struggle to secure necessary
material conditions for combatting cultural imperialism (Mattelart, Delcourt, and Mattelart
1983). Later, New Labour recoded these concerns in their “creative industries” trope. Ever
since, that particular formulation has been used incessantly and widely, irrespective of the
political colour of its protagonists or indeed, the nature of their political regime.
Creative industries thinking became a kind of blueprint to be applied or modiﬁed. Read
the ofﬁcial and academic literature and you will ﬁnd that the number and type of “indus-
tries” may – and do – vary from one country to another. And then, at times, the “cultural
industries” may be carefully distinguished from “creative industries”, with culture often
depicted as more fundamental or at the core of a society’s symbolic production (The
Work Foundation 2007). What, however, remains common and largely undisturbed is
the overall strategy pursued by many states: namely, to construct the creative industries
and latterly, the “creative economy”, as a policy object that can be managed to secure pri-
marily economic and sometimes social outcomes so as to increase competitiveness.
The economization of national culture is a globally attractive proposition. Any nation
can adopt it and policy transfer has proven relatively easy. The creative industries idea is
protean and can be readily indigenized to ﬁt local circumstances. It can become the ofﬁcial
policy of the Chinese Communist Party or a development ideology espoused by the United
Nations (Keane 2007; United Nations 2013). It can be used supra-nationally, at nation-state
or sub-state levels, and in the region or city. Consequently, creative nations, regions and
cities, are now so much part of the competitive landscape that everyone takes them for
granted. First, the curatorial institutions invent new spaces, and then they seek to
employ themselves to mow the lawns and trim the hedges that they have themselves
designed.
Thus, for instance, what is called “creative place-making” (Markusen 2014) is an inher-
ently restless, unﬁnished process, because new icons of brand differentiation have continu-
ally to be found and new policies to be devised the better to compete, for instance, in ﬁlm,
TV, games, mega-events or performances. Or new incentives have to be found to stimulate
the earth-scouring quest for location and relocation. This means that the marketplace for
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cultural gabfests for the like-minded and the demand for advice by creative consultants is
never exhausted. Neither is the continuous ﬂow of academic commentary nor the litany of
instruction to up-and-coming generations on how best to prepare themselves for pursuing
the chimera of creative entrepreneurship.
If the UK made the initial policy moves, it was in the USA that the best-known aca-
demic interventions were initially fashioned. The economist, Richard Caves (2000), was
ﬁrst to offer a serious book-length analysis of the creative industries. His work avoided
the now commonplace fetishization of the term. He wrote of diverse “creative goods”
that had something in common – contending rightly that the production of ﬁlms, recorded
music, the visual arts, and cultural events and performances are all highly risky in terms of
any calculation of success or failure. Caves focused on the speciﬁcs of contracts and the
industrial organization of relevant sectors. He did not create a unitary policy object.
That was left to others.
Hot on his heels, another US economist, Richard Florida (2002), writing in a very
different, more popular, style took centre stage, to conjure up and hail the rise of the “crea-
tive class”. In essence, he sold the attractive notion to policy-makers that almost one-third
of Americans could be classiﬁed as “creative” and that by making sure that local conditions
were right for those engaged in cultural work, a wide range of places could be transformed
into creative cities or regions. In this funky re-versioning of Gouldner’s (1979) New Class
theory, erstwhile symbol-manipulating intellectuals were restyled as productive creatives.
Of course, even earlier, post-industrial theorists such as Daniel Bell had presaged such
thinking (1973) but not with such resounding policy éclat.
Enter the creative economy
It was a short step from increasingly pervasive talk about creative industries to the follow-
on coinage of the creative economy that now dominates the scene. We may interpret this
locution as an invitation to think of designated industries as systemically interconnected, as
constituting a whole. The British business consultant, John Howkins (2001), ﬁrst effec-
tively marketed this notion. Like the UK’s DCMS, he laid emphasis on the value of intel-
lectual property and the consequent “global battle for comparative advantage”. From this
perspective, creativity becomes interesting because it is identiﬁed with “human capital” – a
terminology that by analogy ﬁrst and foremost deﬁnes human beings as the objects of
various kinds of investment – education to the fore – that might enhance the qualities of
labour (Becker 2008).
For the most part, the “creative economy” has been a mobilizing slogan. It has been
deployed alongside a range of cognate ideas – and associated practical interventions.
The incessant conceptual parade includes “creative cities”, “creative innovation”, “creative
skills”, “creative education” and “creative ecology”. Moreover, as during the past decade
the digital revolution has reshaped policy thinking everywhere, the “creative turn” has
spawned compound neologisms that try to capture current transformations in production,
circulation and consumption: the “digital creative economy” is a case in point.
The EU provides an illuminating case study of diffusion. While not all member states
have taken up the creative economy cause with equal enthusiasm, by degrees the European
Commission (EC) has been won over to treating it as something to be taken into account.
The creative and cultural industries (CCIs) are at the heart of the European Agenda for
Culture, part of the framework of the EU’s Lisbon Strategy for Jobs and Growth, originally
set out in March 2000.3 In May 2007, the European Council endorsed the role that the CCIs
might play in supporting the Lisbon Strategy and in April 2008, the European Parliament
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(EP) welcomed the Council and Commission’s recognition of the importance of culture
and creativity for the European project.
The EP singled out the contribution of The Economy of Culture in Europe, a report
commissioned by the EC in 2006 from KEA, a Brussels-based consultancy. This was an
undoubted scene-setter for the EU’s “creative turn”. It has been followed by a plethora
of other reports. We might note another major contemporary reference point as, in fact,
the creative turn has been global. The Creative Economy Report 2013 (United Nations
2013) and, in 2008 and 2010, its predecessor versions, have set the frame for much sub-
sequent global debate and policy work.
The EU uses the CCI formulation as a diplomatic balancing act between states that
stress cultural industries and those that emphasize creative industries but overall it is pre-
sently inﬂected towards the economization of culture.
In the second of its major reports for the EC, The Impact of Culture on Creativity, KEA
(2009, 3; emphasis added) further reworked the conceptual landscape and posed the
problem in this way:
The objective of the study is to have a better understanding of the inﬂuence of culture on crea-
tivity, a motor of economic and social innovation.
As “productivity gains at manufacturing level are no longer sufﬁcient to establish a com-
petitive advantage”, what is needed is “culture-based creativity – the kind of thinking
beyond production that has made Apple such a global force in design, or Virgin’s
adding to the ‘experience’ of long-haul aviation”. From a policy point of view, the argu-
ment was intended to insert creativity into innovation policy, among whose objectives
was to “[b]rand Europe as the place to create” along with establishing new programmes,
institutions and regulatory frameworks to support “creative and cultural collaboration”.
The key ambition, though – still a work in progress involving several different collabor-
ators – was “to establish a Creativity Index (with a set of 32 indicators) whose aim is to
assess the creative environment in EU Member States and to enable the development of
a creative ecology in Europe through art and culture” (KEA 2009, 9). The creative
economy policy agenda from the very beginning has been a pitch to governments every-
where to change the emphasis of policy-making.
A clear turning point was reached inside the EU by 2010, by which time the creative
economy had become part of the EC’s doxa. Its Green Paper (European Commission
2010) was an omnium gatherum of things that CCIs might do for economic development
anywhere, and a rehearsal of what by now had become the conventional wisdom about
their nature and role.4 The EC was seeking a strategy in the context of global competition,
embodied in Europe2020 as well as steps taken to develop a European Agenda for Culture.
The Green Paper pointed forward to what has since become a strategic concern with the
“digital economy”: the creation of “a true single market for online content and services”; an
Innovation Union that would “strengthen the role of CCIs as a catalyst for innovation and
structural change”; and the Strategy on Intellectual Property, especially “the use and man-
agement of rights” (European Commission 2010, 6, 8).
The uneven diffusion of creative industries discourse
While the creative policy turn has not by any means produced uniformity of thinking inside
the EU, there is no doubt that it has impacted on the terms in which culture is thought about
in policy-making circles. Two responses illustrate the point. Others could be cited.
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In Italy, the European Year of Creativity and Innovation 2009 was launched with the
local aim of “growing the awareness of creativity and innovation, key competences for per-
sonal, social and economic development” (Rolando 2009, 1). It involved collaboration
between various government departments in the wake of publication of the Libro bianco
sulla creatività (White Paper on creativity) in 2007. Chaired by an economist, the late
Walter Santagata, the White Paper concentrated on industrial sectors rather than categories
of creative work. Distinctions were drawn between material culture, content industries, and
artistic and historical heritage. In Stefano Rolando’s words, the point was to bring together
“il valore del ‘bello e utile’” (“the value of ‘the beautiful and the useful’”). The creative
turn taken in London a decade earlier, and by then endorsed in Brussels, provoked an
attempt to measure the total value of the creative sectors in Italy, in particular, the percen-
tage of GDP and the workforce for which these accounted.
Santagata’s report aimed to delineate an Italian “model of creativity” to assist national
development and establish a statistical basis for international comparison. The 14 desig-
nated ﬁelds of activity were analogous to, but signiﬁcantly different from, the well-worn
nostrums of the UK’s DCMS. They were creative cities, design and material culture,
fashion, architecture, the knowledge economy, advertising, cinema, TV, radio, publishing,
the food industry, contemporary art, music and cultural heritage (Santagata 2007, XI).
National differences persist about which creative industries include or exclude, in
keeping with the diverse institutional development of each state. In Germany, the term Kul-
turwirtschaft was the starting point for discussing the “creative industries”. In 2007, on the
basis of its report, Kultur in Deutschland, the Bundestag agreed upon an ofﬁcial federal
deﬁnition, intended to bring statistical consistency to research and analysis.
The term [… ] Creative Industries, is generally and broadly applied to […] those cultural or
creative enterprises […] that predominantly operate commercially and are concerned with the
creation, production, distribution and/or medial [sic] circulation of cultural/creative goods and
services.
Included under the deﬁnition of “Cultural Industries” are the following core sectors: the music
industry, the literary market, the art market, the ﬁlm industry, radio, the performing arts, the
design industry, architecture and the press. The term “Creative Industries” incorporates
additional sub-segments that include the advertising industry, the software/gaming industry
as well as a category denoted as “miscellaneous”. (As originally translated from German in
Projektzukunft 2008, 5; cf. Reich 2013, 16)
This is another variation on the theme of classiﬁcation, with creative industries on this
occasion clearly subordinate to cultural industries. Both the German and Italian examples
link the need for categorization to the desire for measurement, a matter of growing impor-
tance for the global governance of the creative economy, and a policy question in its own
right for bodies such as the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).
By 2012, the question of how to measure the CCIs was ﬁrmly on the EU agenda. In
parallel with wider arguments rehearsed elsewhere (Cooke and De Propris 2011; Cunning-
ham 2014) innovation policy had also been adjusted to include “smart specialization strat-
egies” sensitive to the creative economy and KEA (2012, 30) had been commissioned “to
create a benchmarking raster… or set of indicators, to measure policies focusing on local
economic development through CCIs”. The new framework was intended to aid European
regional and urban centres in accessing EU structural funds, with the central focus of the
new toolkit on “policy instruments which impact on local economic and business develop-
ment” (KEA 2012, 3). However unevenly, a dominant way of seeing was being established
in the EU.
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The approach outlined above extended to the EP. In a report for its Committee on
Culture and Education on how culture could be used in the interests of cohesion, an
appeal was made to European solidarity beyond the economy, with a clear recognition
of the strains and stresses provoked by the present economic crisis. The report, speaking
of a “paradigm shift” in recognition of the connections between “different dimensions
of culture”, noted key moves in European policies but also bluntly underlined the inade-
quacy of that acknowledgement, given that culture was not merely “a sector but a resource”
that – conceived more broadly – might enhance EU social and economic development in
multifold ways and “keep the European utopia alive” (European Parliament 2012, 10, 15).
While, the term “culture” was deployed in line with the EP’s broad preference, the
overwhelming focus was on its economic and social uses, underlining the present emphasis
on an instrumental approach, inﬂected by the incorporation of creative economy thinking.
It is not surprising then, that in Brussels as in London, the economic value of European
culture is routinely summarized in a familiar kind of headline statement: that the creative
sectors represent more than 3% of European GDP and employ some 3% of the EU’s work-
force (EC 2016).
Alongside such regional shifts, as have taken place in Europe, the globalization of these
ideas has been best illustrated by UNESCO’s series of three Creative economy reports, the
ﬁrst of which, published in in 2008, called the creative economy a “new development para-
digm” covering all forms of cultural work. Diverse political regimes and distinct levels of
economic development have shaped the speciﬁc take-up of ideas originally minted in
London. These have been indigenized in East Asia, China and Australasia (Flew 2012).
Some now argue that the 2013 version of the trio of United Nations reports has rep-
resented a challenge to the dominant discourse and, in effect, is subverting it from
within. Great hopes are placed on rehabilitating of the idea of a “cultural economy” –
with the emphasis on culture rather than economy, on the social rather than the individual
(Isar 2015). Although such views do not occupy the mainstream, they are part of an inter-
national counter-discourse to that of the creative economy.
The practical embodiment of ideas
Cultural policy is by no means exclusively concerned with economic outcomes. But its
dominant focus on accountability through quantitative measures has set the parameters
for bodies intervening in the cultural sphere – whether these be arts councils, museums
and galleries, public service broadcasters, operas and orchestras or theatres and libraries.
This takes us into the realm of “cultural intermediaries”, a term inﬂuentially deployed
by Bourdieu (1984). A little-studied area until recently, this is now of growing academic
interest (Smith Maguire and Matthews 2014).
One telling instance of the impact of creative economy orthodoxy in the UK may be
illustrated by the case of the BBC, still the UK’s premier mainstream cultural and journal-
istic body and a brand of huge importance in the serious global game of exercising “soft
power”.
The future orientation of the BBC will be decided after the conclusion of a process
known as the Charter Review. The new Charter will run until 2027. The Review is
meant to be a period of reﬂection that occurs every decade to revisit the BBC’s purposes,
scope and scale, and to result in a new deal for the British public (and by extension for the
global audiences that increasingly access the BBC’s output).
Under political pressure, the BBC has sought to redeﬁne its legitimacy. Positioning
itself for the Charter Review its submission to the UK Government’s consultation was
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tellingly titled British Bold Creative. It was not just the title, though, that proclaimed mem-
bership of the creative club. The corporation professed its ambition to become “Britain’s
creative partner and a platform for this country’s incredible talent and the work done by
its great public institutions” (BBC 2015, 6). The UK government responded in kind. It
enjoined the BBC to make “supporting the creative industries […] the heart of its oper-
ations, taking care to minimize any undue market impacts” (DCMS 2016b, 10).
The case of the BBC reﬂects the increased normalization of creative industries think-
ing. The discursive mélange of constant gardener and patriotic marketer captures perfectly
the reﬂex, modal way of talking about the role of culture in the public sphere, across arts
bodies, support agencies, government and indeed higher education. Ever-ready creative
partners proclaim their virtue and relevance by being useful to the national or global
economy.
The extent of this thinking can readily be judged from the publications routinely pro-
duced by the major British arts and cultural organizations. Its depth of penetration may be
illustrated by some of my most recent research into British cultural agencies where,
together with colleagues, I have illustrated the ideological force of policy intervention
by government in shaping the work of bodies ofﬁcially designated part of the creative
economy.5
In what follows, I wish to use the term “cultural intermediaries” in a particular sense: to
describe public bodies whose mission is to make the creative economy work more effec-
tively in line with the overarching national goals pursued by states. In that regard, although
the examples presented here concern British agencies, the organizational rationales
pursued are typical of many bodies worldwide that have been set up to intervene purpose-
fully in culture.
First, we should note the importance of the distinct institutional landscapes within
which such support agencies work. They are shaped by a distinct history of policy ideas
as well as fashionable thought about what at any moment constitutes relevant know-
how for intervening in, and building, a competitive creative economy. Each agency con-
nects with its political masters and funders, its clientele, and a range of businesses of
diverse scales. Most typically, the latter are small- to medium-sized enterprises or
microbusinesses.
One of our studies, which took the form of both contemporary history and cultural soci-
ology, concerned the creation, life and death of the UK Film Council (UKFC) (Doyle et al.
2015). The UKFC was the strategic body set up in 2000 to bring an elusive “sustainability”
to the ﬁlm industry and culture in Britain. Based in London, its institutional life lasted for
just over a decade. Film policy, constantly oscillating between cultural and economic
goals, was the Ur-model for the wider creative industries policies now in place in the
UK. Yet, even in the digital age ﬁlm policy has retained a certain distinctiveness –
which underlines the continuing importance of the distinct sectors that persist within the
creative industries framework.
After a decade’s intervention, on the agency’s demise nothing really fundamental had
changed: crucially, the British ﬁlm industry was still fragmented – “unsustainable”. There
were some positive outcomes: the key form of support for the British ﬁlm industry, inward
investment in UK ﬁlm production by the USA, grew; British box ofﬁce receipts increased
somewhat; the digitization of exhibition was accelerated; regional ﬁlm funding rose. Iro-
nically, the Oscar-winning movie, The King’s Speech, was an outstanding post-mortem
success for a defunct agency, which had part-funded this production.
The political architects of creative industries policy – the ﬁrst NewLabour government –
had created the Film Council for industrial reasons. The British Film Institute (BFI), until
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then the premier ﬁlm body, tasked with a primarily cultural role, became a subordinate insti-
tution. This was a strong signal of the pre-eminence of industrial purposes over cultural
policy. A decade later, the UKFC was summarily closed down on supposed efﬁciency
grounds by Conservative ministers at the start of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat
coalition government of 2010–2015.More money was spent than saved by shifting its func-
tions – ironically – into theBFI. Now this body itself has been repurposed – deﬁned as a crea-
tive industries body that straddles, and must negotiate, industrial and cultural priorities that
often diverge (BFI 2012). Viewed historically, ﬁlm policy in the UK has produced a scra-
pheap of defunct agencies – each originally set up to make things more efﬁcient. What
has not changed, though, is the state’s interest in managing a prime cultural industry.
Our second case concerns an ethnographic, sociological study of a Scottish business
support agency, Cultural Enterprise Ofﬁce (CEO), set up in Glasgow by a coalition of
public sector bodies in 2001 (Schlesinger, Selfe, and Munro 2015a). A true embodiment
of the creative turn, the formation of CEO was typical of moves taking place all over
the UK at the time.
We found that, over its lifespan, whichever political party was in power, intervention in
the Scottish creative economy was modelled on the received wisdom produced by policy-
makers, think tanks and academics working in London – the pre-eminent centre of such
thinking in Europe. In this inherited policy framework, CEO assisted microbusinesses in
Scotland to become more “businesslike”, providing “soft” business support – advice
and training. This type of intervention is one of the instruments that policy-makers use
when trying to increase the scale and robustness of creative enterprises, although it can
be really difﬁcult for support bodies of this kind to demonstrate the impact of their inter-
vention to funders.
The two studies discussed above focused on the mediation of policy – the day-to-day
implementation of policy-inﬂuenced practice in the cultural ﬁeld that occurs in response to
the formulation of grand ideas, such as that of building a globally competitive creative
economy. Completed only recently, they have demonstrated the tenacity of dominant
ideas and the extent to which intervention by cultural intermediaries is deeply inﬂuenced
by policy frameworks and the supporting discourses that both justify and amplify them. Of
course, on the ground, public policy initiatives may be cherry-picked by those in creative
work, and what are seen as irrelevant ideas simply ignored. Such stratagems, however, do
not change the overall picture. Variants of creative economy thinking have set the terms of
reference for any sort of entry to the conversation.
Shaping the academic agenda
Cultural intermediation of an analogous kind also occurs in higher education. At least 30
universities around the UK –my own included – presently offer undergraduate and masters
courses in the creative and/or cultural industries, or the creative economy, with or without
some explicit admixture of the digital dimension – and this kind of provision is emulated
elsewhere. What holds for teaching also applies to research. Like their counterparts in other
countries, the UK Research Councils have invested heavily in research into the creative
and digital economies. This agenda has developed hand in glove with that of government
policy, to which the Research Councils are extremely responsive. Although their priorities
do not determine the precise scope of what research can be done, like all agenda setting, the
themes laid down by such inﬂuential funding bodies and the terms in which they are pre-
sented do tell us what to think about, even if disaffectedly.
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In parallel with public cultural bodies, the institutionalization of the creative economy
agenda in British universities has developed apace. The bevy of degree courses already
mentioned supplies talent for a saturated and largely under-paying marketplace, where per-
sonal connections count hugely, unpaid internships are common, and in which precarious
“portfolio” work is the norm – although these tough conditions do not diminish its attrac-
tiveness, as McRobbie (2016) has shown in her illuminating studies. Aware of the fragility
of such forms of cultural work, she contends that a reﬂexive pedagogy “permits…‘shards
of light’ to emerge as preﬁgurative forms of social understanding and political conscious-
ness” (McRobbie 2016, 9–10). On her evidence, though, this progressive take appears to
be more a consolatory belief than an unambiguously demonstrable conclusion. In many
respects, the exigent conditions of work in the creative sectors sum up the state of play
for generations entering the wider job market right now as members of the “precariat”
(Standing 2011).
Along with the growth of university courses, in the past few years the UK Research
Councils have been committed to research on the creative economy and the overlapping
“digital economy” and to effecting brokerage between the higher education and creative
sectors. Similar kinds of investment have been made in other countries.
A key illustrative initiative in the UK was the establishment of ﬁve major university
consortia, four of which were designated “knowledge exchange hubs for the creative
economy”.6 The ﬁfth grouping was set up as a research centre, with a remit to research
copyright and new business models in the creative economy.7 At the end of 2016, all of
these centres came to the end of their funded four-year lifespan, although it seems
highly likely that the research focus on the creative economy will continue.8
Such initiatives mobilize signiﬁcant numbers of academic researchers and organize their
connections with a range of enterprises, artists and performers, public bodies and govern-
ments, and therefore understandably become a focus of public accountability for money
spent (AHRC 2015). Engagement of this kind can undoubtedly be valuable because aca-
demics are also citizens and may beneﬁt society by their knowledgeable involvement
outside the academy. Arguably, we should use our expertise to play into policy debate and
advice. That said, howwe do this, and on what terms, is surely a major matter for discussion.
My own participation in the work of several bodies concernedwith the creative economy has
certainly givenme insights into the pressures these encounter, not least from government and
major business interests determined to pursue their own goals. It has also added considerably
to my professional academic knowledge of how things really work.
In essence, then, the terms of trade for academic researchers of the creative economy
are ambiguous, not least in the much-vaunted pursuit of “knowledge exchange” with the
worlds of practice, which is extremely complicated (Schlesinger, Selfe, and Munro
2015b). Although the programmatic approach currently taken by the UK Research Coun-
cils does not necessarily exclude any particular project nor preclude the possibility of cri-
tique, the framework has been shaped by the continuous demand to demonstrate the
relevance of the research or engagement in question to the overarching aim of building
up speciﬁc sectors of the national economy so that these will operate more effectively
under conditions of global competitiveness.
Countervailing trends?
Of course, the creative turn has not been an exclusive goal but rather a dominant one. In
this section, I shall retain the focus on currents at play in the British case which, given its
wider inﬂuence, may portend wider shifts. Let us consider two recent interventions that
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have begun to sound a different note, repositioning the creative economy in relation to
wider conceptions of ﬁrst, cultural policy, and second, cultural value.
In the ﬁrst instance, the UK Government published The Culture White Paper in March
2016. This was proudly proclaimed to be the ﬁrst such document since 1965, and under-
lined the broad value of culture to British society, noting the importance of three types of
cultural value:
– the intrinsic value: the enriching value of culture in and of itself;
– the social value: improving educational attainment and helping people to be heal-
thier; and
– the economic value: the contribution culture makes to economic growth and job-cre-
ation. (DCMS 2016a, 15)
It has been rare for “intrinsic value” to be taken seriously by governments in recent years.
“Social value”, which ﬁts a broadly utilitarian calculus, has certainly ﬁgured in the thinking
of all governments, but has not been accorded the weight of “economic value”, as will be
clear from the argument so far.
Perhaps the new, expressly cultural turn is not too surprising, as the UK has been con-
vulsed of late by a number of crises that take a cultural form. These include anxieties in
major sections of the public about the extent of migration from the EU and immigration
more generally; the UK’s ambivalent relationship to the EU, evidenced by the “Brexit”
Referendum of 23 June 2016; the existence of home-grown jihadism and both ofﬁcial
and public concern about the social integration of some elements of the British Muslim
community; and the continuing challenge to Great Britishness of the quest for Scottish
independence. Appeals to the creative economy really cannot offer a new roadmap for
how to address such shortcomings in the workings of UKanian culture. It is no accident,
surely, that the ofﬁcial cultural policy agenda has broadened precisely to take in concern
about social inclusion, building employment opportunities for ethnic minorities and econ-
omically disadvantaged young people, and how to address and capitalize on the UK’s
growing diversity. As the present cultural crisis is also a crisis of the British state, is it sur-
prising that how the UK projects itself internationally – the question of its “soft power” and
“brand” – and how it attracts visitors and tourists, also ﬁgure large?
All of this, however, plays in the White Paper against the Conservative government’s
enthusiastic advocacy of reductions in public support for the cultural sectors and its encour-
agement to those working in these ﬁelds to make good the shortfall by raising more private
funds. In the end, one must conclude, it is not so easy to abolish the continuing salience of
the creative economy under the nominal cover of cultural policy. When providing ﬁgures
about the economic value of culture, recourse was made in the White Paper to the govern-
ment’s creative economy statistics (DCMS 2016a, 16). Moreover, when discussing the
uses of a “measurement framework” that “seeks to consolidate evidence on the value of
culture”, the White Paper not surprisingly noted that assessing the impact of cultural
policy was “strongest for economic development. For personal wellbeing, educational
attainment, life chances and soft power, more work is needed to reﬁne how we measure
the speciﬁc impact that culture makes” (DCMS 2016a, 58). It remains to be seen, therefore,
whether this is a ﬁrst step on a new road or –more likely – simply the setting up of a diver-
sion on an old one.
The second example concerns a report published by the AHRC in April 2016. This
summed up the results of the Research Council’s “cultural value project”, an initiative
taking up “the imperative to reposition ﬁrst-hand, individual experience of arts and
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culture at the heart of enquiry into cultural value” (Crossick and Kaszynska 2016). This
intervention intended, inter alia, to question the primacy of economic value and was
also an attempt to reframe the purposes and character of evaluation in the prevalent dis-
course and policy framework.9 Although this initiative sought to extend the Research
Council’s agenda in the ﬁeld of cultural research, it was recognized that the very
concept of cultural value “may be seen as a construct of policy” and that, consequently,
research has “tended to be driven by the case for public funding, and this has led to a
focus on the publicly-funded arts” (Crossick and Kaszynska 2016, 24). In short, the
project itself was unavoidably framed by the creative economy agenda to which it has
been a riposte and therefore constrained to broaden debate without, however, surmounting
the original epistemological obstacle.
This effort to enlarge the scope of what is relevant to academic research has made use
of the concept of an “ecology of culture”, stressing the interconnections of distinct publicly
funded, commercial, third-sector, amateur and participatory practices. While it is important
to note this existing complexity, the concept of a cultural ecology is itself freighted with
unexplored meaning. Unnoticed by the authors, in the context of the UK, where the multi-
national character of the state is under deep strain, the use of ecological metaphors may be
interpreted not only as a way of virtuously conjoining diverse cultural funding regimes and
practices but also – much more signiﬁcantly – as one of carelessly erecting enclosures
around the component national cultures of the state. In the context of arguments for Scot-
tish independence, consider the potential political uses to be made of an English or a Scot-
tish cultural ecology.10 Cultural ecologies can easily be reformulated as “national
ecologies”, with profound consequences for identities.11
Conclusion
Since the creative economy became a policy object, this has gradually given rise to a sup-
porting “creative economy industry”, which is not only national but also international.
Academic research and publishing have become an important part of this, alongside the
incessant ﬂow of reports from policy advisers, creative consultants and conferences orga-
nized by proﬁt-driven ideas brokers and interest groups.
The espousal of creative economy thinking means that culture is seen primarily as
embodying tradable economic value. A self-sustaining, self-referential framework of
ideas has developed that has become largely impervious to critique. The omnipresence
of creative economy thinking raises questions about how the research agenda is being for-
mulated and the consequent positioning of academics in debate.
To note the prevalence of the economic dimension does not at all mean that other
valuations of culture have been eclipsed. There are counter-discourses and, as has
been shown, the expediency of policy means that compromises can be effected and
different registers adopted, according to circumstances. Mostly beyond the imaginings
of the policy world, people continue to engage in cultural practices for their inherent
satisfaction, the pursuit of aesthetic goals, their own and others’ fulﬁlment and self-devel-
opment. Craft sensibilities – such as those that shape the patient achievement of high-
level skills or the fastidious making of objects, described so well by Sennett (2008) –
have not disappeared.12
If we stopped talking about the creative economy would anything be lost? Hardly. We
still have ways of discussing human inventiveness and originality. Nothing stops us speak-
ing comprehensibly about the diversity of cultural practices that continue to exist but which
have long been overshadowed by a compelling label of convenience that has put the
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economy in the driving seat and shaped the public discourse so insistently. Surely, that is
enough of an invitation to think afresh.
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Notes
1. This point is considered later when discussing the role of “cultural intermediaries”.
2. I was a member of the boards of Scottish Screen (the erstwhile national audiovisual agency)
from 1997 to 2004, and of TRCMedia (a not-for-proﬁt media training body) from 1998 to
2008. I have also been a member of the Advisory Committee for Scotland of Ofcom (the
UK communications regulator) from 2004 to date, and since 2014 of that body’s Content
Board. In respect of the latter, this article has been written in a purely professional academic
capacity and any views expressed here are entirely my own.
3. In the six lines above, I have drawn directly on Schlesinger, Selfe, and Munro (2015a, 15).
4. The Green Paper (EC 2010, 5) aimed “at capturing the various connotations ascribed to the
terms ‘cultural’ and ‘creative’ throughout the EU, reﬂecting Europe’s cultural diversity”. It
deﬁned “cultural industries” as
producing and distributing goods or services which at the time they are developed are considered
to have a speciﬁc attribute, use or purpose which embodies or conveys cultural expressions, irre-
spective of the commercial value they may have. Besides the traditional arts sectors (performing
arts, visual arts, cultural heritage – including the public sector), they include ﬁlm, DVD and video,
television and radio, video games, new media, music, books and press.
For their part, “creative industries”
use culture as an input and have a cultural dimension, although their outputs are mainly functional.
They include architecture and design, which integrate creative elements into wider processes, as
well as subsectors such as graphic design, fashion design or advertising.
5. Although that work draws out some features of current practice in the UK it has much wider,
comparative implications.
6. Funded until April 2016, these were: The Creative Exchange; Design in Action; Creative
Works London; and REACT.
7. CREATe. I must declare an interest. I have been Deputy Director of this centre from its incep-
tion; its funding ends in December 2016.
8. In June 2016, the AHRC issued a call for candidates competing to become Creative Economy
Champion to consolidate existing work and shape future strategy and partnerships in the ﬁeld.
Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research 15
9. The category of “experience” is treated as conceptually unproblematic in this project, being
characterized as “fundamental and irreducible” (Crossick and Kaszynska 2016, 21) – itself a
highly questionable assumption.
10. In an as yet unpublished paper on “Cultural Policy and Ecology”, I have argued that the under-
lying holism underplays culture’s agonistic qualities and that the concept of the cultural eco-
system biologises culture, thereby turning the analyst into a “doctor” concerned with its
health and ailments. For instances of such curative thinking, see Holden (2015) and The
Warwick Commission (2015).
11. An analogous point about constructing English history in ways that ignore the UK’s other
nations has been made by Thomas (2016, 73).
12. McRobbie (2016, 13–14 and Ch. 6) has reservations about Sennett’s idealization of craft, not
least because of his treatment of gender. But his work, nonetheless, offers an important norma-
tive counter-narrative to that of the creativistas.
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